Which comes first: institutions or selves? Liberal democracies operate as if selves preceded institutions. By and large, pre-Reformation culture places the institution before the self. The self, and particularly the conscience as the source of deepest ethical and spiritual counsel, is intimately shaped, by the institution of the Church. This shaping is both ethical and spiritual; by no means least, it ensures the soul's salvation, though administering the sacraments especially of baptism, penance, and the Eucharist.
corporations. 1 In its extreme (though by no means uncommon) form, 'liberty to'
arrogates for itself what had been the sole prerogative of God, to act in absolute freedom. 2 Such an ideology, in both its less and more extreme forms (i.e. its liberal and libertarian forms), will produce its characteristic forms of history and literary criticism.
Its historians will write institutional histories as histories of dissent from institutions.
This tradition locates dissent because it admires dissent, persuaded as it is that the fully formed conscience is capable of producing persuasive, ethically impressive alternatives to oppressive institutions.
The literary critics who subscribe to such an ideology will treat the individual as a self-contained unit, independent of, and prior to, the institutions within which the individual is situated. The individual in this tradition is, as the word implies, indivisible; the individual is, in Lee Patterson's words, 'understood not as conditioned by social practices and institutions but as an autonomous being who creates the historical world through self-directed efforts'. 3 The function of literary criticism will be to delineate 'character', and to locate unmediated agency as a desired ideal, rather than to analyze the ways in which self and institutions are mutually dependent. For both historians and literary critics in the liberal tradition, the individual is separable from, and prior to, institutions.
The liberal tradition and its offshoot the libertarian tradition trace their genealogy principally to the Reformation of the sixteenth-century. What is the news on this question from the pre-Reformation Church? By and large, pre-Reformation culture places the institution before the self. The self, and particularly the conscience as the source of deepest ethical and spiritual counsel, is intimately shaped, by the institution of the Church. This shaping is both ethical and spiritual; by no means least, it ensures the soul's salvation, though administering the sacraments especially of baptism, penance, and the Eucharist. The conscience is not a lonely entity in such an institutional culture. It is, rather, the portable voice of accumulated, communal history and wisdom:
it is, as the word itself suggests, a 'con-scientia', a 'knowing with'. 4 This tradition will admire and produce histories not of dissent but of institution-building and institutional commitment, such as Church history and hagiography. It will regard the institution as prior to the individual; it will also represent selves experiencing individuality as an intensely painful problem.
The late fourteenth-century English poem Piers Plowman admires dissent; it recognizes the need for new institutional forms, and it trusts, up to a point, the capacity of conscience to generate those new institutional forms. Does this mean that Langland regards the self as prior to institutions? Does this mean that Langland's protagonist Will is a self-contained, indivisible 'character', an abbreviation for 'William', as the great nineteenth-century editor W. W. Skeat refers to him? 5 Does this mean that for Langland institutions are secondary to the prior entity of the self?
In this essay I will argue that, for Langland, the self is fundamentally dependent on institutions, and in particular the institution of the Church. For Langland ecclesiology -or how the Church is shaped as an institution -is not at all separable from ideal forms of selfhood. For Langland, ecclesiastical satire is inseparable from imagining the self's ideal form. For all that, Langland's is indeed a poem of dissent, in which the conscience does challenge the Church. One hundred and forty years before Luther's courageous act of conscience-driven dissent in 1517, Langland imagines that same dissent. He is also, however, deeply skeptical of that dissenting act, since Langland knows that a damaged Church produces a damaged conscience. This is one of the many reasons why Langland's is a great poem: Piers Plowman inherits a model of the Church that has become untenable, and it knows it. The poem's extraordinary and disrupted range of formal choices is the form that knowledge takes.
Religious Institutions
The pre-Reformation Western Church is a large and variegated entity. The purview of Langland's poem takes many of these institutions into account, but focuses with especial energy on one ecclesiastical institution, that of the friars. I begin by sketching the institutional shape of the Church. 6 In my penultimate section, I will show why Langland should focus so vigorously and so critically on the friars.
The principal division within the pre-Reformation Church was between the secular clergy and the religious orders. The secular clergy (from Christian Latin saecularis, 'of the world') was devoted to the care and instruction of the laity (from Greek laius, 'people'), or people, especially though administering the sacraments. Secular clergy were located in parishes, and organized around a bishop, whose principal seat, or cathedra (meaning 'seat' in Greek), was located in a cathedral, itself located in a major urban centre. In Langland's England, the Archbishop of Canterbury 6 held primacy over that of York. And the archbishops were in turn ultimately subject to the jurisdiction of the pope in Rome.
The religious orders, by contrast, were those orders subject to a regula, or rule.
For the most part, the religious lived in communities bound by their rule; in late medieval England there were upwards of 800 such communities, living under eight or so major types and sub-types of rule. 7 The main divisions among the religious orders was between monks (and nuns), canons and friars. Monasteries (so called from Greek monos, meaning 'single') were first founded in the West in the early sixth century by St Benedict, in the wake of the Fall of Rome (dateable for convenience from 410 CE): after the earthly city collapsed, monks retreated to places far removed from cities. Of course monastic foundations were, as engines of learning, prayer and social influence, necessarily tightly bound into larger systems of worldly power, but the monastery was in principle a self-enclosed heavenly city, imitating the heavenly Jerusalem wherein monks practised a life of contemplation. Each monastery or convent (for women religious) was subject to a rule, the first of which is the Benedictine rule, under the direction of an abbot or abbess. 1365-1388) can be described as a double-header.
To be sure, Langland is writing a specific genre in the Prologue, that of Estates Satire, which is predisposed to moral attack. 11 But hardly a single gesture in the rest of the poem gives any brighter image of a specific institution within the Church. Take for example the priests who welcome Mede, the personification of bribery, to Westminster (1098)). Closer to home, but still in the historical frame of Christianity, Anima also refers admiringly to the conversion of England:
Al was hethynesse som tyme Engelond and Walis, [heatheness] Til Gregory garte clerkes to go here and preche. having been educated through trial in a deep understanding of how humans might meet the standards of God's justice, Anima, the whole soul, can finally speak up. And when he does speak (Anima is, ungrammatically, male), he addresses two questions: charity on the one hand, and ecclesiology on the other.
Our training in the liberal tradition renders, perhaps, the connection of these two subjects surprising: for many modern readers, the question of the deepest sources of the self is entirely separate from any institutional question. These two subject matters might, that is, seem entirely disparate, the one (charity) being concerned with the most profound source of the self, while the other (the Church) addresses the problem of an external institution. If it is reasonably the business of Anima to treat charity (one of his names, after all, is Amor), we might want to ask why Anima should treat the Church. In the texture of Anima's speech as a whole, however, we can see that a treatment of charity is inseparable from a treatment of the Church. The two subjects are intimately related, because, for Langland, selves are grounded in institutions. Another sub-name of Anima is 'Conscience', 'Goddes clerk and his notarie' (B.15.32). This involves the public functions of challenging or not challenging the world around him.
In Passus 15, then, the individual soul (in an ideal form) addresses the Church, as a reforming conscience. The Church as an institution is an inherent part of the story of the soul's education.
Can Langland's Conscience Reform the Church?
The poem, then, enacts a psychosynthesis, at the end of which the individual soul is capable of understanding the deepest sources of charity on the one hand, and has the authority to reform the entire Church on the other. Langland, it would seem, does recognize that institutions nourish the soul, and does recognize that the soul's fullest expression is inseparable from the establishment of a capacious, sacramentdispensing Church.
We began with a question: which comes first, Church or self? We seem to have arrived at a provisional answer, at least. Soul and Church, that is, exist for each other.
Where precisely, however, does Langland locate the source of reform, in the Church, or in the soul? Which is more reliable? In this section I offer one example that suggests that Conscience, and only Conscience, is capable of a truly reforming impulse. My second, more powerful, example suggests the reverse: that a Conscience produced by a failing Church is incapable of reforming that Church. A failed Church produces a failed Conscience. In this second example, we shall also see why the institutional failing of the friars is lethal for the health of the individual soul. 14 My first example is that of Conscience's academic feast in Passus B.13. I begin with a brief recapitulation of the narrative. 15 In this vision (the fourth), Conscience invites Will and Clergy to a feast. The other specified guests are an academic Doctor, Pacience hath be in many place, and paraunter knoweth [perhaps] That no clerk ne kan, as Crist bereth witnesse:
Pacientes vincunt &c. Langland would seem to locate the source of reform in the individual conscience.
That is certainly the conclusion to be drawn from In this final section I argue that Langland resists the aspiration to deliver absolute judgements. Langland refuses the absolute authority of conscience as if it could survey human action as from a position outside history. Instead, Langland remains committed to the reformist energies of history, energies that can be activated only from within the flow of history. He refuses to make absolute distinctions between the saved and the damned, and his satire refuses to make absolute judgements.
Revolutionary satire derives its legitimacy from eschatology: one can see confidently into the present, and isolate those who must be rejected, because one already knows the end of the story. Knowing the end legitimates confident understanding of the beginning, too: the revolutionary satirist moves confidently through history, discriminating the saved from the damned there also. A reformist satire, by contrast, is less ready to discriminate between saved and damned, because the reformist is located within history. The reformist defers eschatological judgment to God. In Piers Plowman, too, clerics come under severe attack. As we shall see, however, Langland resolutely resists the temptation to invest that satirical attack on intellectuals with eschatological force. Instead, he locates his vision profoundly within this world, and so accepts, and even underlines, the limits of that vision and that 'sufferance'. As a result, he calls on the past of his own poem. The pun embedded in the phrase 'partyng felawe' expresses my point about
Langland's recuperative satire: the phrase can mean both 'fellow with whom we take our leave' (a sense surely activated at this moment of leave taking), and 'our partner'.
The narrative history of Langland's poem accentuates the provisional partings of satire, before registering the recuperative restorations. It's true, of course, that we do not see
